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In Australia, a supreme court has a supervisory role over the statutory 
adjudication process that has been established within the security of 
payment legislation. In this role, the courts have quashed many 
adjudication determinations on the grounds of jurisdictional error in 
recent years. This is a problem as the courts’ involvement in statutory 
adjudication is contrary to the object of the legislation. When reviewing 
adjudication determinations, the courts have adopted different 
approaches with respect to determining the role of adjudicators and the 
essential jurisdictional facts that must exist in order for an adjudicator to 
have jurisdiction to hear a referred disputed matter. This diversification of 
judicial interpretation with respect to jurisdictional error is confusing, not 
only to construction professionals, but also to many lawyers. Via a 
desktop study– where the evidence is mainly garnered from case law, 
governmental reports and commentaries – this paper reviews the legal 
complexities involved in diagnosing jurisdictional errors. In doing so, the 
paper aims to answer the question as to why the adjudication process has 
become bogged down in the quagmire of judicial review. The paper 
concludes that the evolving inconsistency of case law in relation to 
statutory adjudication is a crucial factor contributing to the erosion of the 
object of the security of payment legislation in Australia. Moving forward, 
the paper argues that establishing a legislative review mechanism of 
jurisdictional challenges may be sufficient to address this problem. 
Keywords: judicial review, jurisdictional error, review mechanism, 
statutory adjudication, security of payment 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Statutory construction adjudication is a fast-track payment dispute 
resolution process that has been established within the Security of 
Payment (the SOP) legislation to keep the cash flowing down the 
hierarchical contractual chain on construction projects. Its rapid, highly 
regulatory and temporarily binding nature have led to it being often 
described as a ‘quick and dirty’ process (Wallace, 2013, P68:71) that 
delivers ‘rough and ready’ justice (See Watpac Construction (NSW) Pty 
Limited v Austin Corp Pty Limited [2010] NSWSC 168 at [127] per 
McDougall J). As such, adjudicators are always susceptible to make errors 
of law or fact. The supreme courts have a supervisory role over the 
statutory adjudication process. In this role, the courts have quashed 
many adjudication determinations on the grounds of jurisdictional error in 
recent years. This is a problem as the courts’ involvement in statutory 
adjudication is contrary to the object of the SOP legislation. When 
reviewing adjudication determinations, the courts have adopted different 
approaches with respect to determining the essential jurisdictional facts 
that must exist in order for an adjudicator to have jurisdiction to hear a 
referred disputed matter. This diversification of judicial interpretation with 
respect to jurisdictional error is confusing, not only to construction 
professionals, but also many lawyers.  
It is suggested that the court’s inconsistent approach could be a result of 
lacunae within the SOP legislation. The drafters of the legislation may 
have not anticipated the risk of the court’s involvement by way of judicial 
review where the court has no limitations in exercising its supervisory 
role. There is nothing in the legislation nor in case law that exhaustively 
defines jurisdictional facts that must exist in order for an adjudicator to 
have jurisdiction. This leaves the door always ajar for aggrieved parties to 
an adjudication determination to apply for judicial review on the basis 
that an adjudicator’s error is jurisdictional in nature.  
This paper initially reviews the real object of the legislation. The nature of 
errors in adjudication are then discussed, thereby revealing the legal 
complexities involved in diagnosing jurisdictional errors. In doing so, the 
paper aims to answer the question as to why the adjudication process has 
become bogged down in the quagmire of judicial review.  
2. THE OBJECT OF SECURITY OF PAYMENT LEGISLATION 
Understanding of the object of the SOP legislation will help justify the 
quick, rough and ready justice inherent in the adjudication process. 
Generally speaking, all Australian States have a consistent and express 
object of facilitating cash flow down the hierarchy of construction 
contractual chain through establishing a rapid and cost effective 
alternative scheme of resolving payment disputes compared to traditional 
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lengthy and expensive avenues such as litigation and arbitration1.  As 
such, any delay in releasing the due payment following an adjudication 
decision by challenging it in court will hinder the legislation attaining its 
object. In Hickory Developments Pty Ltd v Schiavello (Vic) Pty Ltd [2009] 
VSC 156 at [46]-[47], the Victorian Supreme Court mentioned the 
deficiency of the NSW legislation in achieving its object due to the vast 
amount of judicial review in a very short period of time, and stated: “If 
the Victorian Act became prone to challenges founded on fine legal points, 
an important object of the Act would be defeated by the twin adversaries 
of cost and time.” 
In Western Australia and the Northern Territory, the SOP legislation has 
an additional express object of determining the dispute fairly and as 
rapidly, informally and inexpensively as possible2. In K & J burns Electrical 
Pty Ltd v GRD Group (NT) Pty Ltd [2011] NTCA 1 at [48], the court 
criticised the use of the some ill-defined notion of ‘fairness’ in the 
legislation because the court may be led into reassessing the merits of the 
decision in a manner which fails to draw a firm distinction between 
procedural and substantive unfairness. The design and purpose of the 
rapid adjudication process was well explained as “a trade-off between 
speed and efficiency on the one hand, and contractual and legal precision 
on the other. Its primary aim is to keep the money flowing in the 
contracting chain by enforcing timely payment and sidelining protracted 
or complex disputes.”3  
There is no reason to believe that the WA legislative intention of ensuring 
an expeditious, inexpensive, informal and fair adjudication process should 
be different from its counterparts in the Eastern States. In Brodyn4, his 
Honour Hodgson JA at [31] explained the requirement of adjudicators to 
act fairly and noted at [51] that the intention of the SOP legislation is to 
resolve payment disputes with minimum of delay as well as minimum of 
opportunity for court involvement.  
In Queensland, it was held that the Act “emphasises speed and 
informality”.5 Also, the requirements of natural justice under the SOP 
legislation were well discussed in J Hutchinson Pty Ltd v Cada Formwork 
Pty Ltd [2014] QSC 63 which held at [50] that: “There is nothing in the 
BCIP Act which would exclude the requirements of natural justice”. In 
Victoria, Vickery J considered procedural fairness and noted that: 
                                               
1 See Grocon Constructors Pty Ltd v Planit Cocciardi Joint Venture [2009] VSC 426 at [33]. 
2 See Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA) section 30; Construction Contracts (Security of 
Payments) Act 2004 [NT] section 26. 
3 See the Minister's Second Reading Speech (WA Hansard, 3 March 2004, 275). 
4 Brodyn Pty. Ltd. t/as Time Cost and Quality v Davenport [2004] NSWCA 394. 
5 Minimax Fire Fighting Systems Pty Ltd v. Bremore Engineering (WA Pty Ltd) [2007] QSC 333 at 
[20]. 
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The procedures will call for adaptation in each case in the light of the clear 
legislative intention of the Act, namely that an adjudicator's 
determinations are to be carried out informally: s 22(5A); and speedily: s 
22(4); and 'on the papers': ss 23 and 28I; and bearing in mind that there 
is always the facility for erroneous determinations to be corrected upon a 
final hearing of the issues in dispute between the parties: s 47(3).The 
legislative intention, in my opinion, points strongly to the position that, in 
approaching his or her task, an adjudicator's determination will only be 
brought into question if there has been a substantial denial of the 
measure of procedural fairness required under the Act.6  
3. JURISDICTIONAL ERRORS IN STATUTORY ADJUDICATION  
Errors made by adjudicators, that may possibly give rise to legal 
challenge, can essentially be categorised into two types: jurisdictional 
errors and errors of law on the face of the record. There are two types of 
jurisdictional errors in adjudication. The first type relates to the existence 
of essential jurisdictional facts upon which the validity of the adjudicator’s 
appointment is founded, including the existence of a construction contract 
and duly made payment claim. Any error by an adjudicator in finding such 
facts will automatically invalidate the adjudication process and any 
emerging determinations from that process. The second type relates to 
the adjudication making process where the adjudicator may exceed his or 
her jurisdiction by, for instance, failing to give both parties enough 
opportunity to respond to any issues or relying on evidence not advanced 
by either party. Although errors of fact may be jurisdictional in nature, 
most errors of fact made by adjudicators are regarded by the courts as 
being non-jurisdictional for the simple reason that a high level of precision 
cannot be expected from such a rough and ready process. As stated by 
Vickery J: 
 “An adjudicator charged with the making of an adjudication determination 
under the Act is entitled to make an error of fact and not have that 
decision reviewed judicially. This is sometimes described as the power to 
make a wrong decision”.7  
Having said this, it needs to be recognised that certain errors of fact may 
give rise to jurisdictional errors by dint of the existence of the fact being 
necessary to enliven an adjudicator’s authority to make a determination 
under the SOP legislation. As stated by the Supreme Court of WA, 
“ordinarily, an error of fact does not give rise to a jurisdictional error and 
thus is outside the scope of the court's review power. Not so when a fact 
is jurisdictional. The court must be satisfied that a jurisdictional fact 
actually (objectively) exists”.8  
                                               
6 Grocon Constructors Pty Ltd v Planit Cocciardi Joint Venture (No 2) [2009] VSC 426 at [143]-
[144]. 
7 See Sugar Australia Pty Ltd v Southern Ocean Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 535 at [9]. 
8 See Perrinepod Pty Ltd v Georgiou Group Building Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 217 at [11]. 
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The law concerning the difference between jurisdictional errors and errors 
of law on the face of the record is notoriously confusing. As Vickery J 
states in the recent decision of Amasya Enterprises Pty Ltd & Anor v Asta 
Developments (Aust) Pty Ltd,9 “the difficulty in drawing a bright line 
between jurisdictional error and error on the face of the record is well 
recognised”.10  Vickery J considered the question of what may amount to 
an absence of a jurisdictional fact by referring to Chase Oyster Bar v 
Hamo Industries,11 where McDougall J observed that a ‘jurisdictional fact’ 
had previously been described by the courts as “a criterion the 
satisfaction of which enlivens the exercise of the statutory power or 
discretion in question”.12 Vickery J noted:  
If the exercise of power is challenged on the basis that the 
jurisdictional fact does not exist, the court must itself inquire into 
the existence of that fact. It may grant relief against the exercise of 
jurisdiction if it finds that the jurisdictional fact did not exist. If on 
the other hand the legislature confers on the decision-maker the 
power to authoritatively determine the existence of a jurisdictional 
fact, the court may inquire into the decision-maker’s decision that 
the jurisdictional fact exists, but it will not itself inquire into the 
existence of that jurisdictional fact.13  
The former approach (i.e. whether the jurisdictional fact actually existed) 
has been termed a ‘narrow’ judicial approach, whereas the latter 
approach (i.e. whether it was reasonable for the adjudicator to believe 
that the jurisdictional fact existed) has been termed a ‘broad’ judicial 
approach (Society of Construction Law Australia, 2014, p248). The courts 
in NSW and Victoria have considered that the “proper approach to 
construction, where some fact is specified as a pre-condition to the 
exercise of jurisdiction by a court, is to regard it as a matter for that court 
to decide whether or not the fact exists, unless the statute clearly 
precludes that approach”.14   
An error of law on the face of the record is generally held to be 
understood as an error contained within the pleadings and certified order 
made at the conclusion of the matter.15 In the context of adjudication, 
this equates to the adjudication application, adjudication response, 
perhaps any further written submissions and comment thereto requested 
or permitted by the adjudicator and the determination itself.16 It is 
                                               
9 [2015] VSC 233. 
10 Amasya Enterprises Pty Ltd & Anor v Asta Developments (Aust) Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 233 at [74]. 
11 (2010) 78 NSWLR 393 at [164] to [172]. 
12 Amasya Enterprises Pty Ltd & Anor v Asta Developments (Aust) Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 233 at [83]. 
13 Amasya Enterprises Pty Ltd & Anor v Asta Developments (Aust) Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 233 at [86]. 
14 Chase Oyster Bar v Hamo Industries (2010) 78 NSWLR 393 per McDougall J at [172]; Sugar 
Australia Pty Ltd v Southern Ocean Pty Ltd & Anor [2013] VSC 535. 
15 Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) [2010] 239 CLR 531 at [82]; Amasya Enterprises Pty Ltd & Anor v 
Asta Developments (Aust) Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 233 at [91] to [93]. 
16 Musico v Davenport [2003] NSWSC 977 at [66]. 
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possible for an error of law on the face of the record to be jurisdictional or 
non-jurisdictional in nature depending on whether or not it leads to an 
erroneous decision. Under administrative law, it is possible for the courts 
to make an order in the nature of the prerogative writ of certiorari in 
order to quash the impugned decision for either jurisdictional error or 
error of law on the face of the record,17 which are considered separate 
and distinct bases for the making of such an order.18 With respect to 
statutory adjudication, the courts have from the beginning to the present 
day taken a consistent approach in ruling that non-jurisdictional errors of 
law on the face of the record are not sufficient to warrant judicial 
review.19 In other words, any errors of law made by an adjudicator acting 
within jurisdiction will not be amenable to judicial review. However, the 
court’s approach to judicial review for jurisdictional error has not been so 
consistent. 
4. THE EVOLVING INCONSISTENCY OF CASE LAW 
In the first case to consider whether judicial review was available to 
challenge an adjudicator’s determination – Musico v Davenport [2003] 
NSWSC 977 – the NSW Supreme Court applied the same scope of judicial 
review to adjudicators as that previously applied by the High Court of 
Australia to administrative tribunals. As such, it was held that where an 
adjudicator falls into an error of law that causes him or her to make an 
erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, jurisdictional error 
could occur. As McDougall J stated at [46]: “In some cases, an error of 
law may lead to jurisdictional error, although the distinction between 
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors of law is easier to state than to 
apply”. As such, in Musico, the Court held that patent errors of law made 
by the adjudicator, that led to him failing to value the payment claim in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the contract as required by the 
SOP legislation did amount to jurisdictional error. Musico was 
subsequently followed in several decisions.20   
                                               
17 It has been held that whilst State Parliaments cannot legislate to take away from State Supreme 
Courts their power to grant relief for jurisdictional error, State Parliaments can deny State 
Supreme Courts relief for non-jurisdictional error appearing on the face of the record. This is 
due to the federal constitutional roots of judicial review for jurisdictional error. See Kirk v 
Industrial Court (NSW) [2010] 239 CLR 531 at [99] to [100]; Amasya Enterprises Pty Ltd & 
Anor v Asta Developments (Aust) Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 233 at [94](f). 
18 Amasya Enterprises Pty Ltd & Anor v Asta Developments (Aust) Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 233 at [72]. 
19 Musico v Davenport [2003] NSWSC 977 at [54] (McDougall J); Brodyn v Davenport [2005] 
NSWCA 394 at [51] (Hodgson JA). In Musico at [54], McDougall J referred to section 25(4) of 
the NSW Act as evidence of Parliament’s intent that review on the basis of non-jurisdictional 
error was not to be permitted. Section 25(4) prohibits a respondent from challenging an 
adjudicator’s determination in any proceedings initiated by the respondent to set aside an 
adjudicator’s determination which has been filed by the claimant as a judgment for a debt in 
court.  
20 See, eg, Abacus Funds Management v Davenport [2003] NSWSC 1027; Multiplex Constructions 
Pty Ltd v Luikens [2003] NSWSC 1140; Quasar Constructions v Demtech Pty Ltd [2004] 
NSWSC 116. 
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The tide turned, however, in the NSW Court of Appeal’s 2004 decision in 
Brodyn Pty Ltd v Davenport [2004] NSWCA 394, in which the NSW Court 
of Appeal found that relief in the nature of the prerogative writ of 
certiorari was not available for adjudicators’ determinations. Hodgson JA 
found at [54]-[55] that, given the legislative intent, the jurisdictional 
error approach “has tended to cast the net too widely”, and that exact 
compliance with the more detailed requirements of the Act was not 
essential to the existence of a determination. Hodgson JA instead 
preferred the approach that an adjudicator’s determination would be 
considered valid unless it had failed to meet one of the essential pre-
conditions for the existence of an adjudicator’s determination under the 
Act; a bona fide attempt by the adjudicator and no substantial denial of 
the measure of natural justice, in which case the determination would be 
void, and, therefore, relief would be available by way of declaration or 
injunction, without the need to quash the determination by way of an 
order in the nature of certiorari.  Thus, in Brodyn, the Court held that 
relief was not available where an adjudicator had erroneously determined 
a payment claim (one of several made after contract termination) that 
should have been found invalid in accordance with the contractual 
provisions which permitted only one payment claim to be made after 
termination. This approach significantly curtailed the scope for an 
adjudicator’s determination to be set aside.   
Brodyn held as a good law for a period of around five years until the 
judicial approach once again changed tack, almost turning full circle, by 
the authority of Chase Oyster Bar v Hamo Industries [2010] NSWCA 190, 
to a position where jurisdictional error with relief in the form of the 
prerogative writ of certiorari was re-established in NSW as the basis for 
judicial review. The catalyst for this reinstatement of jurisdictional error 
was the High Court’s finding in Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 
CLR 531 (Kirk). In that case, it was held at [100] that: “Legislation which 
would take from a State Supreme Court power to grant relief on account 
of jurisdictional error is beyond State legislative power”.    
In Chase Oyster Bar v Hamo Industries, the NSW Court of Appeal 
considered whether an adjudicator had power to determine an 
adjudication application not made in compliance with s 17(2)(a) of the 
SOP Act. In that case, Spigelman CJ observed at [5] that “the process of 
adjudication… is a public, relevantly a statutory, dispute resolution 
process, and as a consequence is subject to the supervisory jurisdiction”. 
McDougall emphasised at [149] that: “The decision in Brodyn appears to 
assume that there is a distinction between a basic and essential 
requirement for the existence of an adjudicator’s determination and a 
jurisdictional condition, or jurisdictional fact.” His Honour went on to 
conclude that: “the requirement of s 17(2)(a) are jurisdictional, in the 
sense that the giving of notice within the requisite period is a condition 
that must be satisfied for a valid application to be made pursuant to 
s 17(1)”. As such, it was held that an incorrect finding by the adjudicator 
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that an adjudication application had been given within the time limit 
prescribed by section 17(2)(a) of the NSW Act was vitiated with 
jurisdictional error. Post Chase, the courts, broadly speaking, have shown 
little appetite to broaden the opportunities to challenge adjudication 
determinations too far beyond Brodyn and Chase.21 In contrast to Musico, 
for example, the Court held in Clyde Bergemann v Varley Power [2011] 
NSWSC 1039 that an adjudicator who had fallen into error by failing to 
correctly apply the relevant contractual provisions in order to calculate 
the amount of a progress payment had not fallen into jurisdictional error.  
In 2015, the NSW Supreme Court of Appeal in Lewence Construction Pty 
Ltd v Southern Han Breakfast Point Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 288 
(Lewence), overturned the trial judge’s finding that the adjudicator’s 
determination of a reference date was a finding of jurisdictional fact. The 
Court held that the question of whether a ‘reference date’ has occurred, 
which gives rise to an entitlement to a progress payment under the SOP 
Act, is not a matter that the court can quash an adjudication 
determination over if the adjudicator gets it wrong.22 This means that the 
existence of a reference date is not an essential pre-condition for having a 
valid payment claim, thus it is not considered as a jurisdictional fact. This 
decision not only overrules many previous authorities in the NSW,23 but 
also completely inconsistent with the position of the Queensland courts24 . 
Two months after the decision in Lewence, the Victorian Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Saville v Hallmarc Constructions Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 318 
handed down its decision which was completely in contrary to Lewence 
authority. In that case, the court upheld the decision of the trial judge 
(Vickery J) who held that the reference date fixed by the adjudicator 
under the Act was wrong and that as a consequence the adjudicator 
ought not to have assumed jurisdiction and the adjudication 
determination is of no legal effect. 
In Western Australia (WA), the Supreme Court has been consistent in 
adopting a broad approach when dealing with jurisdictional facts under s 
31(2)(a), considering the adjudicator’s role to be analogous to an inferior 
court.25 However, in the recent judgment of Laing O’Rourke Australia 
Construction Pty Ltd v Samsung C & T Corporation [2015] WASC 237, 
Mitchell J, expressed his reservations about the broad sense approach 
which an adjudicator is empowered to authoritatively determine. The 
                                               
21 See, eg, Bauen Constructions Pty Ltd v Sky General Services Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1123 
(Sackar J) where the court held that the adjudicator committed jurisdictional error for, inter 
alia, failure to consider compliance with s 13(4).  
22 [2015] NSWCA 288 per Ward JA at [60], [93]; Emmett JA at [119]; Sackville AJA at [133]. 
23 See, eg, Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v McConnell Dowell Constructors (Aust) Pty 
Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1413; Omega House Pty Ltd v Khouzame [2014] NSWSC 1837. 
24 See Lean Field Developments Pty Ltd v E & I Global Solutions (Aust) Pty Ltd [2014] QSC 293. 
25 See, eg, Wqube Port of Dampier v Philip Loots of Kahlia Nominees Ltd [2014] WASC 331 at 
[78]; Cape Range Electrical Contractors Pty Ltd v Austral Construction Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 
304 at [83]. 
679 
judicial reviews in WA have often been contained to a consideration of an 
adjudicator’s decision to dismiss or not to dismiss an adjudication 
application under sections 31(2) and 46 of the Construction Contracts Act 
2004 (WA). The proposition that the adjudicator in WA has an authority to 
decide questions of law authoritatively and wrongly26 held as a good law 
until the Supreme Court handed its decision in Laing O’Rourke Australia 
Construction Pty Ltd v Samsung C & T Corporation [2015] WASC 237. In 
that case, the scope for challenging adjudicator’s determinations was 
broadened as the Court held that that the adjudicator committed a 
jurisdictional error when determining a payment dispute other than by 
reference to the terms of the construction contract which are before him.  
5. THE CONSEQUENCES OF INCONSISTENT CASE LAW 
As demonstrated above, the Supreme Court judges including those within 
the same jurisdiction have been inconsistent in their approaches to 
defining jurisdictional facts upon which the jurisdiction of adjudicator can 
be determined. As a result, the examination of the dynamic case law 
generated in connection with adjudication indicates that deciding upon 
jurisdiction becomes a more challenging task for adjudicators. Drawing a 
line to identify the boundaries of jurisdictional facts is not without 
difficulty. Indeed, the existing case law so far suggests that many 
adjudicators (whether legally trained or not) continue to make mistakes in 
deciding upon jurisdictional matters. To ensure that adjudicators maintain 
an up-to- date knowledge of the evolving case law may be an 
unattainable goal unless a strict and well-regulated continuous 
professional development (CPD) requirement is mandated.  
It is submitted that even smart and well experienced lawyers advising 
parties on adjudication matters have become more uncertain nowadays 
than any time before regarding the likely approach that the court may 
take in dealing with any untested area of the SOP legislation. This 
unpredictability means that claimants relying upon a favourable 
adjudication determination may do so at their peril. A claimant who, for 
example, exercises their statutory rights to suspend works subsequent to 
the non-payment of an adjudication decision by a respondent, or a 
claimant who has to defend the soundness of an adjudication 
determination in their favour which has been challenged by way of 
lengthy judicial review, may end up in a serious trap potentially 
endangering the financial survival of their business. 
This situation has indeed deterred many parties from using the statutory 
adjudication platform, instead preferring other traditional avenues 
although they be more expensive and lengthy. This is because the 
uncertainty and lack of finality of adjudication determinations, especially 
for large payment claims, has made the adjudication process and 
                                               
26 See O’Donnell Griffin Pty Ltd v John Holland Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 19 at [102]. 
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subsequent enforcement proceedings more akin to curial proceedings in 
terms of time and cost concerns. Accordingly, the SOP legislation 
becomes not only more inaccessible to many vulnerable firms, but also 
more inconvenient as engaging legal counsel, in order to advise on 
complex issues and ensure the chances for success, becomes a necessity. 
6. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This paper has examined the evolving tension between the object of the 
SOP legislation and the supervisory role of supreme courts. In doing so, 
the legal complexities and judicial inconsistencies in dealing with 
jurisdictional errors have been discussed. The paper concludes that the 
inconsistency of case law has increased the parties’ uncertainty about the 
finality of adjudication determinations – this, it is proposed, is a key 
significant factor contributing to the erosion of the object of the SOP 
legislation in Australia.  
Moving forward, reform is needed to address this serious problem. An 
example of one approach that could be taken to tackle the problem is to 
amend the SOP legislation such that essential jurisdictional facts that 
must exist in order for an adjudicator to assume jurisdiction are 
exhaustively listed with finer procedural matters being left for 
adjudicators to decide upon. Alternatively, another suggestion is that 
jurisdictional challenges be separated from the merits of the dispute, so 
adjudicators can only deal with the real dispute as many adjudicators lack 
the legal training and knowledge to adequately deal with complex 
jurisdictional matters. As such, any jurisdictional challenges should be 
dealt with in parallel by establishing a legislative review mechanism via a 
quick, informal and cost effective process by competent tribunal who has 
the jurisdiction to consider questions of law. Such an arrangement it is 
proposed would not only ensure a better certainty in adjudication 
outcome, but also discourage the parties from turning to the judicial 
system. As stated in Re Graham Anstee-Brook; Ex Parte Mount Gibson 
Mining Ltd [2011] WASC 172 at [64]:  
     Availability of prerogative relief will be undermined by circumstances 
where parties could avail themselves of alternative remedies by way 
of rehearing, appeal or review. Circumstances where parties have 
been granted and hold alternative review options bear upon the 
availability of prerogative relief as a matter of discretion.27  
The lead author is currently examining the need and features of such 
review mechanism via an empirical research as part of his PhD study. 
 
                                               
27 See Also, the High Court's decision in The Queen v Cook; Ex parte Twigg [1980] HCA 36 [29], 
[30] and [34]; Re Baker; Ex parte Johnston (1981) 55 ALJR 191 and Martin CJ in Re Carey; 
Ex parte Exclude Holdings Pty Ltd [2006] WASCA 219 at [128] - [140]. 
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